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THE FRENCH BAR.
A few pages concerning the French Bar may not be unwelcome
to the readers of the Journal. The history of the institution, at once
venerable and virile, and of its influence upon legislation and juris-
prudence, upon public opinion and national policy is replete with
interest, and with lessons and worthy example to the profession in
every country. The utmost that the writer of a brief article on so
large a subject can hope for, is so to touch upon it that those who
read will desire to know more and initiate further researches of their
own.
The Bar in France is organized into what is known as the Order
of Barristers (Ordre des Avocats). The union of its members was
purely voluntary and due to their own initiative, for the purposes of
mutual aid and encouragement. This resulted in the gradual for-
mation of a body whose existence could not be ignored and whose
solidarity secured to its action an influence universally acknowl-
edged, so that in time its entity was recognized by the laws of the
State and important rights and privileges were conceded to it. From
early days the institution avoided and disclaimed the character of a
guild or corporation acting under governmental license or sanction
and Chancellor D'Aguesseau declared that Barristers did not con-
stitute a body or corporation in the proper sense of those terms.
They are held together, he said, solely by the exercise of a common
duty; they are separate individuals severally devoted to the defense
of litigants, rather than members of one body in the precise mean-
ing of that term,--a Profession, or Order, is the word best express-
ing the status or situation of the Barristers. If there be a sort of
discipline established among them, for the honor and repute of the
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Order, it is rather the result of voluntary agreement than the work
of public authority.
In France, from the earliest times, the Germanic principle pre-
vailed which required that all litigants should appear in person to
present their claims, but ignorant or unskilful pleaders were per-
mitted the aid of a defender to speak for them, and the judge even
appointed such a defender for widows, minors and paupers. This
system was recognized as early as the Merovingians. Persons so
aiding were not, however, designated as "advocatus"-but only as
"defensores, "clamatores," and the term "advocatus" was reserved
for the representatives of those privileged ones who were exempted
from personal appearance, and whose representation included the
preparation of the pleadings or other judicial instruments, as well as
the oral presentation of the case, thus cumulating the office of
Solicitor and Barrister-or "avocat and avouW."
The avocat or barrister is he who has the right to appear before
Courts of Justice and plead for the rights of others.
The avou6 or solicitor (until the Revolution, known as a "procu-
reur") is he to whom is entrusted the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings, and the preparation of such judicial writings as are required
and is recognized as the direct representative of the parties in inter-
est before the courts.
Under the influence of the rigid formalism of the feudal juris-
dictions from the Ninth Century (to the Thirteenth), professional
assistance became well-nigh indispensable. Declarations made in
the judicial forum could not be withdrawn and the necessity for the
most cautious formulation brought into requisition the aid of advis-
ers, and then of skilful exponents well instructed in all the rules and
phraseology of procedure. These men spoke in presence of their
clients who were bound by what they said, unless at once disavowed.
They were the "prolocutors," narrators-or serjeants.
Towards the end of the Twelfth Century, the study of law
became more systematic and imperative. Ecclesiastical Courts
were established by the Bishops under the Presidency of their Del-
egates. The procedure was regulated, being a modification,--by
the canons of the.Councils-of the Roman procedure, and about
these courts there grew up a body of advocates that were made sub-
ject to regulation. They were required to give three years of study
to the Canon and Civil law, and to acquiring a practical knowledge
of procedure, and to take a professional oath, before being admitted
to practice. These advocates not only pleaded, but also prepared
the "libellus" or complaint and other papers, thus uniting, to this
extent as we have seen, the functions of barrister and solicitor.
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Clerics were only allowed to practice in cases for the Church and
for the Poor-and without fee, while all others were allowed an
honorarium.
Even after the separation of the functions of Barrister and
Solicitor had been thoroughly established, it still remained the privi-
lege of the Barrister to draw all pleadings, and this included com-
plaints, answers, replies and counter-replies.
In 1274 for the first time, an Ordinance of Philippe le Hardi, sub-
jected lawyers in the secular courts to regulation and discipline.
They were required to renew their official oath each year, promising
to take none but just causes and never to claim a fee in excess of
thirty livres. Later Ordinances forbade the use of offensive lan-
guage, and of injurious delays, and required an official roll on which
lawyers were inscribed in the chronological order of their admis-
sion.
The Ordinance of 1277 prescribed regulations for the presenta-
tion of cases, condemning useless repetition and enjoining counsel
not to "ravel and embroil" their statements but to make their alle-
gations plain and direct. The same Ordinance made it the duty of
the magistrate to listen "peaceably" to the arguments, which was
what Ulpian had, centuries before, enjoined upon pro-consuls.
The apparent necessity for this latter provision is recalled by the
distinguished advocate Philippe Dupin, the noted defender of Mar-
shal Ney, tried and condemned under the Restoration for his return
to the Napoleonic Standard.
Usage required counsel to address the court "bonneted" as palpa-
ble evidence of the freedom of speech allowed to counsel. One of
the readings of Othello's lines, recalls this symbolism: "My
demerits may speak, and bonneted, to as proud a fortune as
this that I have reached." In like manner it was the privilege of the
Spanish Grandee not to uncover in presence of the King. On the
trial of Marshal Ney, before the House of Peers, Dupin was forced
to uncover, not only, according to him, by the symbolic removal of
his Barrister's Cap, but by the hindrance to the freedom of his
defense. This may explain the fervor of his remarks on the deplor-
able habit of judicial impatience.
"If the profession of the law has its honors," says Dupin, "it
has also its annoyances, and among these the most trying, against
which lawyers in all times have most complained, and which on
occasion has excited their resentment and animosity against the
magistrates, is to be needlessly interrupted, and hectored without
cause during the progress of an argument. Such interruptions
are all the more regrettable that they are apt to bring on altercations
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between court and counsel in which self-love plays so great a part
that it is difficult for counsel to hold an even balance and avoid
excess, while the court may well become at once judge and avenger."
As early as 1302, when the Court of Parliament ceased to make
its circuits throughout the country and became permanently located
at Paris, the nucleus of the Order which still subsists was formed
by the Barristers, now for the first time brought together by a com-
mon residence.
In 1327 under Philippe de Valois, Letters Patent regulated the
Bar of the Chatelet, which was the criminal jurisdiction of the
Paris district.
This ordinance repeated the precision of the Ordinance of 1274
prescribing a Roll of Barristers, and barristers were required not
only to take the oath but to be inscribed upon the roll. Here, too,
is found the division of Barristers and Solicitors, as it contained a
prohibition against the exercise of both functions by the same per-
son. Counsel were not allowed to argue more than three cases at
one sitting, and if counsel "prevaricated" he was to be excluded
from the Bar of the Chatelet, and from all Royal offices.
Shortly after the Ordinance of 1327, a more formal association
was organized, made up of both Barristers and Solicitors, "Avo-
cats" and "Procureurs," known as the Confraternity of Saint Nico-
las. This, as its name implies, was mainly, if not wholly a religious
association, and was evidenced by the attendance at Mass, and at
various acts of public worship in common. From this sprang,
about half a century later, what was known as the "Community of
Barristers and Solicitors," the purpose of which was enlarged and
included a supervision over the actions of its members in matters
of judicial procedure, and the general protection of their privileges.
From this association the Barristers gradually withdrew, and in
view of the special rights and privileges accorded to them, formed
a separate organization which at the close of the Sixteenth Century
took the name of Order of Barristers, electing their own head who
was designated as "Bitonnier," from the fact that in all public pro-
cessions he bore the "biton" or banner of the Order.
Prior to this time the discipline of lawyers was in the hands of
Parliament or the Court of Parliament, as the Royal High Court
was then designated, and Parliament established additional regula-
tions not covered by the text of the Ordinances, such as the require-
ments of study, the length of probation, the costumes to be worn,
the penalties for any infraction of professional duty, and also
enforced punctual attendance of the lawyers to their duties, and
regulated the recesses granted to them.
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As early as 1662 owing to the increase in their numbers, they
were divided into ten sections or "Columns," each of which
appointed two delegates to represent it, and these twenty delegates
constituted the "Council of the Order" as it still remains to-day,-
charged with the regulation of the affairs of the Order, with the
discipline of the members, and the guardianship of the Roll of
Barristers.
The Order of Barristers was from time to time recognized by
various Royal Ordinances, and these, with acknowledged customs,
governed the admission of barristers, and their rights and duties.
We have noticed that before the Ecclesiastical Courts, organized
by the Bishops towards the end of the Twelfth Century, clerics were
only allowed to practice in defense of the rights of the poor or of
the rights of the Church, and gratuitously.
Later regulations, extending as far as the Sixteenth Century
gave leave to secular clergy to plead before the courts and very many
availed themselves of the privilege. Recent rules have, however,
declared the condition or profession of an ecclesiastic incompatible
with that of an advocate. Their absorption in their religious duties
which must of necessity remove them from the real practice of the
profession of the law, makes the two occupations incompatible, and
to this objection has been added one which the recent laws of sep-
aration have removed, to wit, that the members of the clergy
receive a salary from the State and are, therefore, dependent for
that salary and the means of livelihood, upon the arbitrary law of
the State.
A notable instance in which this question was decided was that
of the distinguished Dominican, Father Lacordaire, who before
becoming an ecclesiastic, had been a Barrister. He had left the Bar
for the Church; in 1831 prosecutions were brought against him,
Montalembert, Lamennais and others, for the offense of maintaining
a School in contravention of the Napoleonic law of 18o6, which pro-
vided that an Imperial University should be established and should
have exclusive control of "all public teaching and education through-
out the Empire." He applied for re-admission to the Bar, and his
application was denied on the ground that the clerical office was
incompatible wth the profession of Barrister. He thereupon
pleaded his own case in "pro pria persona" as a layman, without
the cap and robes of the Barrister.
Once the attempt was made, by Chancellor Maupeou, in 1771,
to make the position of the Barrister a purchasable office, and one
hundred were appointed by Governmental decree, without examina-
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tion, but upon the fall of the Maupeou Ministry in 1774, the decree
was rescinded and the office suppressed.
The Order of Barristers was considered by the Revolution as a
privileged corporation, and in its not unnatural distrust of every
established and influential body, abolished and dissolved it by its
Decree of September, 1790, thus extinguishing the authority and
prestige which had attached to it through a long and honorable tra-
dition.
The Constituent Assembly, however, acknowledged the right
of litigants to have their cases presented by persons of their own
selection and from that time until Napoleon's provisional Decree of
i8o4, litigants were advised and were represented in court by any
person whom they might select, the only qualification being that
lie should be a citizcn,--and the Bar, as a body, was eclipsed during
that period.
Lawyers, it will be remembered, were not recognized by the san-
guinary Tribunal of the Revolution (Decree 22nd of September,
1794). It was not until the Decree of 13th March, 18o4, under
Bonaparte as First Consul, that provision was made for the re-estab-
lishment of a Roll of Barristers, and the requirement renewed of a
diploma as Bachelor of Laws, as a requisite to the practice of the
profession. This Decree did not, however, resurrect the Order of
Barristers which was finally done by the Decree of December, 18io.
In the meantime, however, and almost immediately after the Revo-
lutionary Decree, a voluntary association of Barristers had been
formed, who made it their duty to hold together and preserve the
traditions of their suspended Order, and admitted to their comrade-
ship only men of recognized integrity and approved merit. Even in
these troubled times, these high-minded men concerned themselves
with recruiting an instructed Bar and established courses of study
which were continued until the Order was revived. Among those
who thus held together until the re-establishment of the Order, were
de S~ze, the courageous defender of Louis XVI, the Elder Berryer,
de la Malle, Bonnet, Bellart, Lanjuinais, Pigneau, and others of
equal value. Somewhat earlier than i8o4, however, under the Con-
sulate in i8oo, Solicitors were appointed before the Court of last
resort (Court of Cassation), and in i8o6, these Solicitors were
declared by law to be Barristers with the exclusive privilege of
pleading before the Court of Cassation and a like privilege was con-
ferred the same year upon the Barristers who pleaded before the
Council of State.
A later Ordinance of 1' 17 united these two bodies, giving each
the privilege of appearing both before the Court of Cassation and
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the Council of State, and limiting their number to sixty, a limit
which has not since been extended.
It is no small tribute to the profession that Napoleon, as early
as i8o4, should have recognized the necessity of a trained Bar and
have put an end to the condition existing since the Revolutionary
Decree of i79o, which had done away with the Bar and permitted
such judicial assistance as could be had to be furnished by anyone.
From that Decree to the measure of i8io was another large step,
which we may be sure only a sense of necessity induced Napoleon
to make, for in answer to the pleading and pressure exercised by
Cambac~r6s for the re-establishment of the Order of the Barristers,
Napoleon wrote: "As long as I wear a sword by my side, I shall
not sign such a decree, I want to be at liberty to cut out the tongue
of the lawyer who uses it against the Government."
We may, therefore, not be surprised that the Emperor's decree,
re-establishing the Order of Barristers, should not have permitted
them the ancient liberties and influences which they had so long
enjoyed. Domination was essential to him and this Decree deprived
the Order of the privilege of nominating their own head and their
Council of discipline. Both of these were to be selected by the
Solicitor General, the leading law officer of the Empire, as he still
is of the Republic. Nor could this Council of discipline be called
together nor act without the consent of the Solicitor Generail, nor
could any lawyer plead outside of the circumscription of the c6urt
where he was inscribed, except upon authorization of the Minister
of Justice.
Other evidences of Napoleon's estimate of the lawyers and his
intention to hold them in repression are found in those sections of
the law which provide for various unusual possibilities of miscon-
duct, with severest repressions. But the Order was gotten together
and with the nucleus which had been kept up by de S~ze, Berryer
and the others in the interim, they slowly recovered much of their
prestige in the assertion of their rights, so that upon the fall of the
Empire, they procured a modification of the Decree concerning
them, as early as 1822, although it was far from satisfactory, the
monarchy being apparently willing to accept from Napoleon's
regime, the legacy of power over the Bar. But finally, in 1830,
when the King of France became the "King of the French," further
modifications were made, which virtually restored to the Order of
Barristers all its former authority, and the ancient traditions in ref-
erence to its powers stood formally acknowledged.
Under Louis Napoleon in 1852, there was a slight retrogression,
but in i87o the full privileges of the Order with reference to the
election of its Council and its Bgtonnier, were restored.
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The law requires as the first requisite for admission to the Bar,
a diploma of "Licenci" of Laws, granted by a recognized French
Faculty. This is submitted to the investigation of the Solicitor Gen-
eral of the Republic (Procureur G6n~ral) and upon his satisfactory
report the applicant is turned over to the "Order of Barristers."
If he passes the ordeal of the investigation by the Order, he is pre-
sented to the Court by the "Batonnier" or Presiding Officer of the
Order or by a member of its Council, and his oath of office is
received. The candidate must then apply to the Order for leave
to be permitted to enter upon the next stage of preparation, which is
a novitiate of not less than three years. The petition is referred to
the Council and a Reporter is appointed to look into tlhe facts and
report. The candidate makes a formal call upon the Reporter '.
whom he submits his papers; these must attest his Degree, his offi-
cial oath, his honorable character, and the dignity and independ-
ence which are considered essential to the proper exercise of the
profession. The call of the candidate is returned by the Reporter,
mutual confidence and the most courteous relations are at once
established and a thorough investigation is expected and courted.
Probity is the basis upon which rests the honor of the profes-
sion. Independence of all other ties than those of the profession
is required and no subservience to any other interest is allowable;
any office requiring obedience to a superior, any salaried employ-
ment, any business occupation or agency, everything that can tend
to impair the alletiance of the lawyer to his client and to the Bar,
are held incompatible with the profession, and this extends to the
existence of debts and financial obligations. For the same reason,
the candidate must have his own domicile, an established residence
under his personal control so that clients may at all times have ready
access to him. This need not be an independent household and may
be in his parents' household, but must not be dependent upon it, so
that it may cause any interference with his freedom of consultation
with those %lho are in need of his advice.
Upon the report made to the Council of the Order, discussion
is had and a majority vote determines the acceptance or the rejec-
tion of the petition. Its acceptance gives the candidate the right
to practice his profession, but the right is provisional, as he will
not be placed upon the Roll of Barristers until his period of proba-
ti( -i has been satisfactorily passed and the sufficiency of his experi-
ence definitely established. It is his duty in the meanwhile to be
assiduous in his attendance upon the court and at the Bar consulta-
tions of the Ord,;r. He is a Barrister on probation, and may advise
clients, consult with his brethren, appear before the courts, but is
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debarred from many privileges only accorded to those who are
inscribed upon the Roll of Barristers.
The course of the postulant during the years of probation is
under the surveillance of the Council of the Order.
The postulants are divided into columns, presided over by a
member of the Council, who instructs them from time to time as to
their customs, regulations, duties and rights of the profession,
inquires into their observance of the requirements, and records their
failures to attend. Weekly meetings are held for study, discussion
and consultation, attendance at which is strictly obligatory. These
are presided over by the President (Bitonnier) of the Order, and
that the discussions may be serious, a careful statement of the ques-
tions to be debated is prepared in writing by the Secretary and
printed two weeks in advance.
At the end of the term of probation, if the Report as to the
progress of the postulant in gathering the requisite experience of
his profession is not satisfactory, or if he has failed to reach the
high standard of conduct and to maintain the dignity and independ-
ence deemed essential to practice at the Bar, the Council of the
Order of Barristers may decline to enroll him, or may require
another year of probation.
If the assiduity and the progress of the inchoate lawyer have
been satisfactory, if his conduct has been such as to attest the moral
standard, the dignity and independence of character essential to the
exercise of a liberal profession, his name is inscribed upon the Roll
and he becomes a member of the Order of Barristers, an upholder
of the strict discipline to which he willingly remains subject.
The French law does not take the same view of a counsel's sole
duty to his client which Lord Brougham passionately enunciated in
the course of his defense of Queen Caroline,--and it is a part of a
Barrister's oath of office that "he will never as counsel or advocate,
say or publish anything contrary to the laws or regulations against
morals, or against the safety of the State or of the public peace." -
In the view of the French, the lawyer remains a citizen and is
not relieved of his primary duties as such by being invested with
the privilege of representing his fellow-citizens in the enforcement
of their legal rights. Their theory was expressed by one of their dis-
tinguished "Batonniers," Mr. Rousse, when he said to the assem-
bled postulants for admission to the Roll:
"It is well for you to be reminded that in order to become good
lawyers, you must first be good men and good citizens."
Among other requirements of the Barrister's oath is that "he




Freedom of criticism as to judicial proceedings and the decisions
of courts is not hampered by this oath; such freedom is held to be
vital to the independence of the Bar, but the absolute right of dis-
sent and criticism does not permit denunciation or the imputation of
unworthy motives. It is the privilege and the self-imposed duty
of the Order of Barristers to see that the Barrister whose name has
with its sanction been placed upon the Roll shall demean himself
in accordance with the high obligations imposed upon him. For
any infraction the order imposes punishment by reprimand, by sus-
pension or by striking the name of the offender from the Roll.
What modifications have been made in later years curtailing the
complete powers of the Order over all its members, has been the
work of jurisprudence, and it is not uninteresting to trace, in the
land of Codification, the power of modification still exercised by the
courts.
It was claimed from the outset by the Order of Barristers that
the Order had uncontrolled jurisdiction over its roll of membership,
in other words, over the Roll of Barristers. That it, and it alone
could determine what Bachelors of Laws should be admitted to pro-
bation, and which of them after probation, should be placed upon
the Roll of Barristers, and that no appeal lay from the decision of
the order. This claim was upheld by numerous decisions and Solic-
itor General Dupin, the distinguished Advocate already mentioned,
insisted that to permit any appeal from the decision of the Council
of the order, would be destructive of the very purpose of their
jurisdiction; that the Council was a Grand Jury where each was
judged by his peers, the purpose and effect of which was to consti-
tute an absolutely independent body where each man was on a par
with every other. Such was the ancient jurisprudence of the Court
of Parliament, and the modem Decree of 1822 had formally
declared that all the ancient customs and usages of the Bar should
remain in full force, and permitted an appeal only from an order
of disbarment or suspension; but the courts gradually extended
this right of appeal and began by applying it to a case where a Bar-
rister asked for reinstatement after resignation and to cases where
lawyers abandoned the Bar of one Department to take up practice
at the Bar of another. In all these cases the court held that a
refusal to reinstate or the refusal to admit in one Department, a
lawyer coming from another, was an interference with an acquired
and vested right and in that respect on a par with disbarment.
Going further, the Court of Cassation in 1867 declared that the
decisions of the Council declining to inscribe the probationer upon
the Rolls at the end of his probation, was likewise an interference
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with a vested right,--that the probationer was in fact a Barrister
entitled to be put upon the Roll when he had passed his probation.
Again the courts stretched the doctrine still further and granted
a right of appeal to Bachelors of Laws, who having taken the oath
have been refused admission as probationer, arguing that the
diploma of Bachelor of Laws procured after years of study gave to
its holder a vested right to the next step for admission to the Bar,
the probation or "stage." This left to the Order nothing but the
right of disciplining the Barrister for misconduct, and finally even
upon this question, appeals are allowed upon the theory that the
right of appeal is a common law right and that if the courts could
not exercise a right of review over the action of the Order of Barris-
ters, it would constitute a monopoly of the profession contrary to
public policy, which requires that the profession should be free to all
who fulfill the conditions established by the law, and that as the
Order of Barristers has no right to add to the requirements of the
law, it has not the right to reject applicants who comply with the
conditions imposed by the law.
The legal right of the lawyer to his honorarium has passed
through several phases. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centu-
ries, a maximum of thirty livres had been fixed, but lawyers were
allowed to bring suit for the recovery of the fee if it was not paid
and their claims were preferred; the court, however, reserved the
right to reduce the honorarium demanded, if it was deemed exces-
sive. The maximum fixed by the Ordinances was not often
respected.
As early as 1345 the purchase of claims or rights in litigation
was forbidden, as well as fees contingent upon recovery, or com-
pensation by share in the recovery.
In more modern times the honorarium was considered as purely
gratuitous and suit could not be brought for its enforcement nor was
it permitted to make payment in advance a condition of service.
This latter prohibition has been relaxed as there was reason to
believe that it was frequently, if not generally disregarded, although
there are not wanting very numerous instances where lawyers give
their services absolutely in the spirit of the requirement.
Although the courts now recognize a lawyer's right of recovery
at law, he is not permitted by the ethics of the Order to send a bill
for professional services, nor is he permitted to give a receipt or
release for an honorarium paid him, for that would imply an obli-
gation and its discharge. This was not always so. In former
centuries, it was the practice of lawyers to give their clients receipts
for the fees paid, but the practice was gradually abandoned. Ill-
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disposed persons suggested that it was abandoned because the
lawyers who were habitually too exacting, did not care to have their
exactions attested by written receipts, and finally an Ordinance of
1579 prescribed, under penalties, an obligation to give written
receipts for fees received. This Ordinance was not observed, and
in i6o2 a Decree of the Parliament of Paris was issued to compel its
enforcement. Three hundred lawyers joined in protesting against
such a Decree and rather than submit to it, asked that their names
be stricken from the Rolls. This professional "strike" was the
cause of much confusion and alarm, for the cause of justice was
interrupted. The King was appealed to and Henry IV with that
genius for accommodation which was one of his titles to popularity,
upheld the principle of the Decree, but restored the lawyers involved
to the Roll and permitted them to continue the exercise of their pro-
fession without condition.
By the ethics of the Order, again the lawyer is bound to give
his advice and his services gratuitously to all who have recourse to
him and who are too poor to remunerate him.
In France the Bar looks with the utmost disfavor upon any
attempt on the part of a Barrister to enforce a claim for his hon-
orarium, and although as we have said the law recognizes such a
claim and the courts will enforce it if appealed to, the Order of
Barristers considers its assertion as an infraction of the dignity of
the profession and reprobates it to the extent of declaring such a
course on the part of any lawyer as improper, and the offender liable
to reprimand, which at the French Bar is still considered a dishonor.
The custom of yearly employment of counsel, so widely spread
in these modern days of corporate activity and embracery is not of
as recent origin as one might suppose. As early as the Sixteenth
Century it was customary for the King and for Towns and Commu-
nities, for the nobility and for wealthy merchants, to retain one or
several lawyers by the year.
Indeed the practice, which has been known sometimes to pre-
vail in recent years, was introduced of retaining on occasion all the
distinguished lawyers within a given circumscription, leaving the
adversary barren of equal opportunities in selecting a defender.
This practice was, however, early recognized as reprehensible and
an Ordinance of Francis I of 1536, required the courts to distribute
counsel according to the demand of the party who had been pre-
vented from a proper selection. Indeed, this relief was recognized
in practice as early as 1369 when Simon De Lafontaine, himself a
distinguished lawyer before the Parliament of Paris, having litiga-
tion with the Religious of St. Denis, demanded that one jean Pas-
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tourel should be assigned to take his case against the Religious, he
having refused De Lafontaine's application to him on the ground
that he was a Vassal of the Religious and could not plead against
them.
The reason successfully assigned by De Lafontaine for his
request was that his opponents had engaged as counsel Nicolas
Romain and that Pastourel and Romain were acknowledged as the
two leading lawyers on feudal questions, and that the question
before the court was one of feudal rights, and that if the Religious
were allowed to retain Romain and silence Pastourel, there would
be great inequality between the litigants.
Some of the requirements of the professional standard may con-
tribute to give us an idea of the honor in which the profession is
held and which it in turn upholds.
No solicitation of clientage is permitted-no sign outside of his
office-no name upon his letter-heads, no indication of his profes-
sion, nor of office hours-the only thing permitted on letter-heads is
the address. His only recommendation must be the care, the study,
the labor, the knowledge devoted to the cases in his charge.
Counsel are bound to communicate to each other the originals of
all documents making up their respective cases-their briefs, mem-
oranda and findings. Nothing must be held back-there must be
no concealment, no surprises.
Counsel is free in the choice of his methods. He is not bound
to follow the instructions of his client, whom on the contrary it is
his duty to instruct. The Barrister is not merely the organ or rep-
resentative of his client, he is first to be his judge; it is his duty to
examine into his client's case with as keen a conscince as he would
look into his own, and his conscience will forbid him to aid in the
success of an unjust cause.
When during the trial the facts developed are such as to preclude
a defence in accord with the truth, counsel must not therefore aban-
don the accused; he may still assist the culprit upon questions of
law and of procedure.
The lawyer, said Dupin, early in the Nineteenth Century, is not
a public functionary, but a private citizen, who, devoting his time to
the vast study of the law, takes upon himself to enlighten other men
upon their rights, defend their property against fraud, their liberties
against the encroachment of power, their persons against the snares
of hate and the perils of oppression.
D'Agnesseau had already in the previous century described him
as one standing for the public weal between the storm of public pas-
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sions and the throne of justice, and laying at the foot of that throne
the petitions and the claims of the people.
Never take pride in having clouded the truth; more sensitive
to the interests of justice than to the desire for an idle reputation,
seek rather to bring out the righteousness of your cause than the
brilliancy of your intellect-was the advice of D'Aguesseau in 1698.
The character of the lawyer, as understood in France, is perhaps
best summed up in the language of Camus-c'to devote one's self
and all one's faculties, to the good of others; to give one's self up
to long study in order to resolve the doubts which a great number
of our laws engender; to become an orator in order to assure the
triumph of oppressed innocence, to consider the privilege of hold-
ing out a helping hand to the poor as a reward to be preferred to the
most expressive gratitude from the great and the rich; to defend
the poor from duty and the rich from interest. These are the traits
which should characterize the lawyer."
Under the old r~gime the general influence of the profession in
political history and in the literary and judicial annals of the coun-
try was great, in spite of the fact that the virtually autocratic form
of monarchical government was not favorable to the influence of the
lawyer, whose power is so largely dependent upon freedom of
speech and the free discussions of deliberative assemblies. Never-
theless, it was not possible for the members of a profession, really
learned and liberal, to be kept in the background. Their independ-
ence and their influence was shown in many great trials where
momentous questions, exciting the animosities of powerful interests,
were met without evasion and discussed without restriction. They
were not infrequently called into the Councils of the nation and
faithful to the training and the traditions of the profession, neither
fear nor favor swayed their judgments. An instance of this is the
conduct of D'Aguesseau when Solicitor General during the last year
of Louis XIV. In defense of what he considered the good of the
State he opposed the will of that redoubtable sovereign with refer-
ence to the Pope's Bull, Unigenitus in condemnation of Quesnel's
Jansenism, and even when summoned to a personal audience per-
sisted in his resistance.
It was this Chancellor who proudly said that "the profession of
the law is as ancient as magistracy and as necessary as justice." As
much to-day as at any time the powerful influence of the profession
upon the even and equal distribution of justice makes of it an essen-
tial element in the preservation of social order.
Paul Fuller.
